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It is well recognised that large business taxpayers are 
qualitatively different from other categories of taxpay-
ers; they make a signifi cant contribution to tax revenues 
collected in most countries and therefore pose a signifi -
cant risk to tax administration effectiveness. Large busi-
nesses, particularly multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
are also different from other taxpayers because of their 
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complex operations and structure. From the late 1990s 
into the 2000s, it became clear that there was a need for 
new strategies for managing large business taxpayers; by 
2005, what later became known as ‘cooperative compli-
ance’ strategies began to emerge in several countries. 
Cooperative compliance represents a shift in thinking for 
tax administrations, away from a deterrence approach 
where taxpayers are coerced to comply with tax rules 
and threatened by audits and penalties, toward a more 
responsive and collaborative approach.
There is evidence of benefi ts of cooperative compliance 
for both taxpayers and tax administrations: quicker re-
sponses to questions, less uncertainty in tax positions as 
questionable tax issues would be resolved before report-
ing, fewer issues to be decided in court, the diminishing 
need for lengthy tax audits and increasing legal certainty 
and predictability. As a result, administrative costs for the 
tax administration and compliance costs for taxpayers 
are expected to decrease. In short, there are many effi -
ciency gains. But there have also been warnings that such 
gains could be too short-sighted. The effi ciency aspect is 
questioned more broadly: the possible short-term gains 
from cost-effectiveness and shortened response time for 
questionable tax issues could be lost in the longer term 
due to corporations’ decreased compliance. Corpora-
tions also question the effi ciency if they face additional 
extra workload. Does cooperative compliance mean that 
tax administrations effectively outsource control to those 
who are supposed to be controlled?
Given the various opinions and concerns about coopera-
tive compliance, it was timely to investigate how these pro-
grammes work out in practice. While taxation has most of-
ten been researched using legal or quantitative approach-
es,  qualitative and ethnographically inspired studies of tax 
administration and taxation are increasingly in demand.1 
Taxation is a complicated issue and we need improved 
understanding of how policies are adapted in practice and 
how taxpayers respond to them.2 There exists a number of 
analyses which – implicitly or explicitly – compare coop-
1 M. L a m b , A. Ly m e r, J. F re e d m a n , S. J a m e s : Taxation: An Inter-
disciplinary Approach to Research, Oxford 2005, Oxford University 
Press; J. A l m : Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: 
lessons from theory, experiments, and fi eld studies, in: International 
Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, pp. 54-77; L. O a t s  (ed.): 
Taxation: A Fieldwork Research Handbook, London and New York 
2012, Routledge; C. P e t e r s : On the legitimacy of international tax 
law, Amsterdam 2014, IBFD; D. R i n g : The promise of international 
tax scholarship and its implications for research design, theory and 
methodology, in: St. Louis University Law Journal, Vol. 55, No. 1, 
2010, pp. 307-330.
2 S. S t e i n m o : The Leap of Faith: The Fiscal Foundations of Success-
ful Government in Europe and America, Oxford 2018, Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
erative compliance programmes from a legal perspective3 
and from a more policy inspired approach.4 While there are 
many insights to be gained from these studies, they do not 
address how cooperative compliance actually works in 
practice. This is where our research makes a contribution.
The aim of this article is thus twofold. First, we present key 
features of the cooperative compliance model in its practical 
implementation and operation. Second, we go beyond na-
tional comparisons and propose seven dimensions of practice 
based on a qualitative comparison of cooperative compliance 
programmes in selected jurisdictions. These universal dimen-
sions ought to be considered when implementing or changing 
cooperative compliance programmes in any jurisdiction.
Method
This article builds on research conducted over several 
years in Northern Europe (in Denmark,5 Finland,6 the 
Netherlands,7 Norway,8 Sweden9 and the UK10) engaging 
3 K. B ro n z e w s k a : Co-operative compliance. A new approach to 
managing taxpayer relations, Amsterdam 2016, IBFD; R. S z u d o c -
z k y, A. M a j d a n s k a : Designing Co-operative Compliance Pro-
grammes: Lessons from the EU State Aid Rules for Tax Administra-
tions, in: British Tax Review, Vol. 2017, No. 2, 2017.
4 OECD: Co-operative Compliance: A Framework. From Enhanced Re-
lationship to Cooperative Compliance, Paris 2013, OECD Publishing; 
L.G.M S t e v e n s , M. P h e i j f f e r, J.G.A. v a n  d e n  B ro e k , T.J. K e i -
j z e r, L. v a n  d e r  H e l - v a n  D j i k  (eds.): Tax supervision – Made to 
measure, The Hague 2012, Committee Horizontal Monitoring Tax and 
Customs Administration.
5 See K. B o l l , M. B re h m  J o h a n s e n : Tax Governance: Corporate 
experiences with Cooperative Compliance in Denmark, Fairtax Work-
ing Paper No. 17, Umeå 2018, Umeå Universitet; K. B o l l : Securing 
Tax Compliance with Collaboration: The Case of Cooperative Compli-
ance in Denmark, in: N. H a s h i m z a d e , Y. E p i f a n t s e v a  (eds.): The 
Routledge Companion to Tax Avoidance Research, Abingdon 2018, 
Routledge, pp. 212-224.
6 T. P o t k a - S o i n i n e n , J. P e l l i n e n, J. K e t t u n e n : Enhanced Cus-
tomer Cooperation: Experiences with cooperative compliance in Fin-
land, Fairtax Working Paper No. 19, Umeå 2018, Umeå Universitet.
7 D. D e  W i d t: Dutch Horizontal Monitoring: The Handicap of a Head 
Start, Fairtax Working Paper No. 13, Umeå 2017, Umeå Universitet.
8 B. B r ø g g e r, K. A z i z : The setting for collaboration about tax com-
pliance in Norway, Fairtax Working Paper No. 18, Umeå 2018, Umeå 
Universitet.
9 L. B j ö r k l u n d  L a r s e n : Sweden: failure of a cooperative compliance 
project?, Fairtax Working Paper No. 7, Umeå 2016, Umeå Universitet; 
L. B j ö r k l u n d  L a r s e n : What Tax Morale? A moral anthropologi-
cal stance on a failed co-operative compliance initiative, in: Journal 
of Tax Administration, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2019, pp. 26-40; L. B j ö r k l u n d 
L a r s e n : Sweden: Failure of a Cooperative Compliance Project?, in: 
E. M u l l i g a n , L. O a t s  (eds.): Contemporary Issues in Tax Research, 
Vol. 3, Birmingham 2018, Fiscal Publications, pp. 7-50.
10 L. O a t s , D. D e  W i d t : Co-operative Compliance: The UK case – 
playing the long game, Fairtax Working Paper No. 22, Umeå 2019, 
Umeå Universitet; see also D. D e  W i d t , L. O a t s , E. M u l l i g a n : The 
US Compliance Assurance Process: A relational signalling approach, 
in: Journal of Tax Administration, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2019, pp. 120-136; D. 
D e  W i d t , L. O a t s : Cooperative Compliance in Action: A UK/Dutch 
Comparison, in: E. M u l l i g a n , L. O a t s  (eds.): Contemporary Is-
sues in Tax Research, Vol. 3, Birmingham 2018, Fiscal Publications, 
pp. 260-277.
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with all stakeholders in the corporate tax arena. We used 
ethnographic techniques, primarily in-depth interviews, 
to investigate how developments in each jurisdiction are 
playing out in practice. In each country, the actors inter-
viewed include large business in-house tax specialists, 
external advisors and industry representative bodies as 
well as tax authority large business specialists. In addi-
tion, we have collected and analysed policy documents, 
media reports and other documents addressing coopera-
tive compliance projects in each country.
The comparison of cooperative compliance models in 
these countries, often considered quite similar, is in-
structive: in the variations shown in the adaptation of the 
model, in the responses they drew from stakeholders and 
in the resulting legacy of the model that will continue to 
shape relations between tax administrations and large 
corporations. The Netherlands and the UK share a his-
torical similarity in their approach to tax administration. 
These two countries were early adopters of cooperative 
compliance models, yet the models they adopted are 
quite different. In the Nordic countries, which adopted 
similar cooperative compliance at a later stage, the out-
comes were very different. In all countries, the history of 
previous collaboration and the external environment have 
been infl uential in shaping the trajectory of cooperative 
compliance. For some countries, cooperative compliance 
was a radical change; for others, it was a slight modifi -
cation of a model that had already been implemented. 
As this research shows, past experiences and relations 
established between tax administrations and large busi-
nesses have a signifi cant impact on how the programmes 
unfolded.
Background
Forerunners in developing cooperative compliance pro-
jects were the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and the US. 
The OECD took on an active role in promoting the bene-
fi ts of cooperative compliance and most of its member 
states’ tax administrations have now implemented their 
own adaptation of the model. This process has been facil-
itated by support for the model from many large business 
taxpayers across jurisdictions.
Cooperative compliance builds on the slogan: “certainty 
in exchange for transparency”.11 It is a proactive approach 
that aims to enhance tax compliance before tax state-
ments are delivered and legal control systems take over. 
There is no universal cooperative compliance model, 
however, three common features include:
11 OECD: Co-operative Tax Compliance: Building Better Tax Control 
Frameworks, Paris 2016, OECD Publishing.
• Risk assessment: more sophisticated risk assessment 
procedures allow for the identifi cation of taxpayers re-
quiring closer monitoring by the tax authority and those 
who can be trusted to be compliant and/or have more 
simple business operations and therefore warrant less 
close monitoring;12
• Real–time working: cooperative compliance models 
generally facilitate real-time working and avoid waiting 
for tax returns to be fi led followed by an audit/exami-
nation, protracted information requests and dispute 
resolution. Corporate taxpayers bring tax issues to the 
attention of the tax authority as they are happening, 
in advance of fi ling, in order to discuss and hopefully 
agree on the tax position and prevent unnecessary in-
quiries and disputes; and
• Mutual understanding: tax authorities with cooperative 
compliance models generally commit resources to up-
skilling tax offi cials so that they are better equipped to 
understand the complexities and context of large cor-
porate taxpayers and have frequent engagement with 
them. In return for increased certainty about the tax 
consequences, taxpayers are expected to be trans-
parent about their activities.
Key features of implementation and operation
Over the years, as more and more countries have intro-
duced cooperative compliance models, it has become 
possible to identify key features of their implementation 
and practical operation. Table 1 shows which of these key 
features are included in the cooperative compliance pro-
grammes in the six countries studied.
Implementation
• Pilot: in some countries, a formal pilot programme has 
been introduced to test the model before becoming 
widely available;
• Explicitness: the model may or may not be explicitly 
described as a cooperative compliance arrangement;
• Legislative change: some models of cooperative com-
pliance require changes in laws and regulations to ena-
ble implementation. In others, the model is embedded 
within the existing legal framework;
12 For a UK/Netherlands comparison of risk assessment processes 
see D. D e  W i d t , L. O a t s : Risk Assessment in a Cooperative Com-
pliance Context: A Dutch-UK Comparison, in: British Tax Review, 
Vol. 2017, No. 2, 2017, pp. 230-248.
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Denmark Finland Netherlands Norway Sweden UK
Implementation
Pilot   
Explicitness    
Legislative 
change
Formality   
Voluntary 
participation














Key features of the cooperative compliance model
S o u rc e : Authors‘ own compilation.
• Formality: may be in the form of a formal legal agree-
ment, a more informal memorandum of understanding 
or an informal arrangement with undocumented ele-
ments;
• Participation: may be voluntary or compulsory. In some 
countries, participation is voluntary, in others by invita-
tion from the tax authority; and
• Inclusiveness: in some countries all large businesses 
are part of the programme, in others only a selection is 
included, leaving some outside of the model.
Operation
• Single point of contact: most models provide for a single 
point of contact with the relevant large taxpayer unit; and
• Provision of advance rulings: where applicable, the 
provision by the tax authority of advance rulings as to 
the tax outcome of large business’ activities may or 
may not be binding on the tax authority.
Dimensions of practice
These dimensions are based on comparisons between 
the countries developed in an inductive manner from the 
empirical material. Our approach to comparison is in-
spired by anthropology,13 selecting various cases strate-
gically in order to achieve the greatest possible amount of 
information on a given problem.14 We maintain our focus 
on how compliance programmes were applied in practice 
and how they impact existing relations between actors in 
the national tax arenas.
Cultural orientation
Cooperative compliance programmes have resulted in 
cultural reorientations. These can be seen in terms of 
time and space as well as relationships to some extent 
in all the studied countries. The timing of interactions 
between large businesses and tax authorities under co-
operative compliance shifts from regular spaced events 
such as fi ling returns, to more irregular needs-based in-
teractions. Spatial changes include the creation of new or 
reorganised large taxpayer units. Relationships shift from 
a command and control, coercive style to a collaborative 
and more consensual approach. In the case of Denmark, 
Finland and the Netherlands, we fi nd the introduction of 
new principles and routines working according to the cul-
tural orientation. In Norway, the main concern was tem-
poral reorientation. Each taxpayer had to work out the 
meaning of a number of changes individually. In Sweden, 
the spatial reorientation evoked strong reactions in the 
absence of a strong collaborative tradition. In the UK, the 
cultural reorientation was much more gradual and there-
fore muted.
Evaluation
The evaluation of cooperative compliance programmes 
against the criteria of effectiveness and effi ciency is very 
diffi cult in all cases. It is problematic to try to fi nd a point 
of comparison in order to determine what the outcomes 
would have been without cooperative compliance. There-
fore, it is diffi cult to infer which outcomes are attributable 
to the cooperative compliance model and which are over-
all attributable to the tax administration’s actions. Based 
on the data collected for the present research, it is not 
possible to say whether the use of tax administrations’ 
resources in any of the countries is more effi cient than 
before or that cooperative compliance has brought about 
direct cost savings.
13 M. S c h n e g g : Anthropology and Comparison: Methodological Chal-
lenges and Tentative Solutions, in: Zeitschrift fü r Ethnologie, Vol. 139, 
No. 1, 2014, pp 55-72; P. v a n  d e r  Ve e r : The Value of Comparison, 
Durham and London 2016, Duke University Press.
14 B. F l y v b j e rg : Five misunderstandings about case-study research, 
in: Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006, pp. 219-245.




The requirement for changed competences as a result 
of cooperative compliance was articulated differently 
both between countries and between stakeholders e.g. 
between corporations and the tax administrations. First, 
corporations in all six countries expressed the belief that 
tax offi cials lack knowledge about business and com-
mercial reality. Secondly, additional or ‘new’ knowledge 
required by tax offi cials varied by country: in Denmark, 
it was the skill to resolve confl icts; in Finland, providing 
good customer service; in Sweden, being a ‘people per-
son’ and in the Netherlands as well as in the UK, offi cials 
were expected to have ‘commercial awareness’ and be 
able to ‘avoid disputes’. There were also issues raised as 
to who should be responsible for building competences 
within the tax administrations.
Hindrances
We fi nd similar kinds of hindrances in all six cases, some 
of which are external and structural, while others are in-
ternal and organisational. External structural hindrances 
include legal issues such as public access to documents, 
equality and the possibility of attaining binding responses 
from the tax administration. They also include more dif-
fuse hindrances such as increased public scrutiny. The in-
ternal organisational hindrances, such as different but co-
existing ‘schools of thought’ and internal discussions on 
impartiality in the tax administration, challenge the work 
with the cooperative compliance programme. The com-
parisons showed that legal matters can come to impede a 
programme. If the external structural hindrances become 
too large to overcome, the cooperative compliance pro-
grammes might not even get so far as to be faced with 
internal organisational hindrances, as was the case in 
Sweden. The effect of increased public scrutiny has been 
felt more acutely in the Netherlands and the UK. The inter-
nal organisational hindrances are more subtly shaping the 
way the programmes unfold.
Resistance
Outspoken resistance has played a minor role in the im-
plementation of cooperative compliance measures in 
some of the countries. In the case of Denmark, Finland 
and Norway the most apt description of the stance of the 
corporations is ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’.15 It can be charac-
terised by the co-existence of silent resistance – declin-
ing an invitation to participate or postponing letters and 
meetings, and loyalty – to stay in place and cope in either 
15 A. H i r s c h m a n : Exit, voice and loyalty. Responses to decline in 
fi rms, organizations and states, 1970, Harvard University Press.
a proactive way or more passively by accepting the prem-
ises but not leading in the collaboration. In the Nether-
lands, resistance is manifest in a failure to apply to join the 
programme. In Sweden the stance was ‘voice’ and ‘exit’, 
which stalled the implementation of the cooperative com-
pliance programme. In the UK, because the programme 
is compulsory for all large businesses, less overt forms 
of resistance include the continuation of old practices of 
withholding information from tax authorities leading to 
new legislative measures more aligned with coercive re-
lationships.
Trust
Trust is widely recognised as being essential in building 
enduring cooperative compliance programmes and rela-
tionships between tax administrations and corporations.16 
In all six countries, the dominant form of trust appeared 
to be the inter-organisational trust. In most cases trust 
seems to persist even if the individuals on either side of 
the relationship change. There were differences between 
the countries as to the types of trust, however. The inter-
personal trust between the tax offi cials and tax directors 
in the corporations plays a signifi cant role, especially in 
the Danish, Finnish and UK cases. Nonetheless, as the 
case of Sweden shows, a high level of measured trust to-
wards tax administrators is not a guarantee of a success-
ful cooperative compliance approach. In the Netherlands, 
resource constraints in the tax authority appear to lead to 
the erosion of large business’ trust in the system.
Equality
The last dimension shows that there was a substantial 
variation between the countries with regard to fair com-
petition and equality. In Norway, it was not problematic 
because the tax law is structured according to industrial 
sectors, which means that corporations accept that dif-
ferent industries might be subject to different treatment. 
In Denmark, the discussion focused on potential favour-
able treatment of corporations and it was pronounced in 
terms of consultancy vs. guidance. The fi rst type of activ-
ity, consultancy, is not allowed for tax offi cials of Skat,17 
whereas the latter activity, guidance, is. In the context 
of the Finnish Syvennetty, discussion about unequable 
treatment has been limited. In Sweden, the discussion of 
inequitable treatment was one of the major obstacles to 
both versions of the programme. The very idea of a VIP 
16 See for example J. F re e d m a n : Restoring Trust in the ‘Fairness’ of 
Corporate Taxation: Increased transparency and the need for institu-
tional reform, in: S. G o s l i n g a  et al. (eds.): Trust and Taxation: Institu-
tions, Interactions and Instruments, Amsterdam 2018, Eleven.
17 Skat stands for Skatteforvaltningen, the Danish customs and tax ad-
ministration.
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lane for certain ‘customers’ in public bureaucracy was not 
well received by Swedish society. In the Netherlands, the 
external perception that Horizontal Monitoring comprises 
an exchange of illegitimate favours leads to speculation 
that it would not be possible to implement it now. In the 
UK, the model applies to all large businesses and there is 
equal treatment within that category of taxpayer; never-
theless, public concern persists that large businesses as 
a whole are treated more favourably by HMRC.18 Our six 
country cases diverge most strongly when it comes to the 
dimension of equal treatment.
Conclusion
The aim of this research project was to draw comparisons 
from beyond the typical aspects of the various ‘models 
of cooperative compliance’ – including national tax laws, 
policies and guidelines, the number of participants or 
size of participating corporations, the year of introduction 
and similar factual dimensions. We have taken inspiration 
from anthropological studies: we accounted for the views 
of a broad range of stakeholders in the tax arena; we were 
interested in the programmes’ outcome in practice; and 
we see taxation as creating relations.19
The seven dimensions we propose – cultural orientation, 
evaluation, competences, hindrances, resistance, trust 
and equality – are not mutually exclusive, but are de-
fi ned in such a way that there are possible overlaps be-
tween them. Such an analytical approach is a strength 
as it allows the analysis to capture more nuances and 
diversity in the material than would a less generous and 
more limited taxonomy. These seven dimensions are 
not ordered in hierarchical importance. Yet some of the 
dimensions show substantial differences between the 
countries, whereas other dimensions reveal more simi-
lar insights.
We offer three concluding remarks. The fi rst is that a num-
ber of cultural, institutional and societal factors infl uence 
compliance practices. As mentioned above, a major trend 
in tax administration has been to shift from a roughly one-
size-fi ts-all approach – where almost all taxpayers experi-
ence a deterrence approach – to a responsive approach 
where various segments of taxpayers receive treatment 
according to their motivational postures on compliance. 
That is a foundational principle of the OECD cooperative 
compliance guidelines. The measures are founded on the 
idea that the will of the individual is the decisive factor for 
tax compliance. In this report, the comparison between 
18 HMRC stands for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the UK’s tax, 
payments and customs authority.
19 See S. S t e i n m o , op. cit.
actual practices in these six countries provides evidence 
that a number of cultural, institutional and societal factors 
also infl uence compliance practices. In other words, tax 
compliance does not only depend on the will of taxpay-
ers. It is equally shaped by the actual interaction between 
the taxpayer and the tax administration as well as by con-
textual factors. When other factors are taken into consid-
eration, as they frequently are in actual practice, other 
venues for cooperation and responsiveness open up. The 
aim of a more responsive tax administration becomes 
more attainable than when the only course of action is to 
infl uence the taxpayers’ will.
The second remark is that other key principles of the 
OECD guidelines – namely voluntary disclosure and real-
time responses – are too narrow and perhaps too ideal-
istic to be feasible guidelines for all circumstances when 
compliance is mitigated. The OECD also defi nes coop-
erative compliance as a regulatory approach building on 
the idea that participating corporations disclose relevant 
information including their tax risks and are transparent 
with the tax administrations. In return, tax administrations 
are to provide real-time predictability and clarity on taxa-
tion issues of relevance for the corporation.20 Our research 
shows that real-time responses are neither welcome nor 
possible under all circumstances. It is actually more cru-
cial to be explicit about a change in the timeframe than to 
have all interactions in real time.
Finally, there is a growing need in all countries for reliable 
evaluation mechanisms. A key ambition for the coopera-
tive compliance measures has been to increase effi ciency 
and effective use of resources for tax administration and 
many stakeholders demand ‘proof’ of effi cient resource 
usage, especially the taxpayers themselves. All countries 
are facing the diffi culty of measuring the impact of these 
programmes. Increased knowledge exchange between 
tax authorities would be benefi cial for further develop-
ing the programmes and evaluating their effects. In actual 
practice, such evaluations of costs and effects need to 
combine subjective and objective criteria, statistical anal-
ysis, logical argument, common sense, human skills and 
judgement.
We fi nd considerable learning between jurisdictions as 
well as a signifi cant heterogeneity in the local implemen-
tation of these models. This has implications for coun-
tries considering adopting cooperative compliance mod-
els, as we have seen that what works well in one juris-
diction may not necessarily translate into effi ciencies in 
another.
20 OECD, op. cit.
